Your space or mine? : Mapping self in time by Christian, Brittany M et al.
Your Space or Mine? Mapping Self in Time
Brittany M. Christian*, Lynden K. Miles, C. Neil Macrae
School of Psychology, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, United Kingdom
Abstract
While humans are capable of mentally transcending the here and now, this faculty for mental time travel (MTT) is
dependent upon an underlying cognitive representation of time. To this end, linguistic, cognitive and behavioral evidence
has revealed that people understand abstract temporal constructs by mapping them to concrete spatial domains (e.g.
past = backward, future = forward). However, very little research has investigated factors that may determine the
topographical characteristics of these spatiotemporal maps. Guided by the imperative role of episodic content for
retrospective and prospective thought (i.e., MTT), here we explored the possibility that the spatialization of time is
influenced by the amount of episodic detail a temporal unit contains. In two experiments, participants mapped temporal
events along mediolateral (Experiment 1) and anterioposterior (Experiment 2) spatial planes. Importantly, the temporal units
varied in self-relevance as they pertained to temporally proximal or distal events in the participant’s own life, the life of a
best friend or the life of an unfamiliar other. Converging evidence from both experiments revealed that the amount of space
used to represent time varied as a function of target (self, best friend or unfamiliar other) and temporal distance. Specifically,
self-time was represented as occupying more space than time pertaining to other targets, but only for temporally proximal
events. These results demonstrate the malleability of space-time mapping and suggest that there is a self-specific
conceptualization of time that may influence MTT as well as other temporally relevant cognitive phenomena.
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Introduction
‘‘Space by itself and time by itself are doomed to fade away
into mere shadows, and only a kind of union of the two will
preserve an independent reality.’’
Albert Einstein
While time travel remains an entertaining impossibility, the
mind at least is unconstrained by physical laws that ground the
body in the present. By mentally replaying past episodes and
foreseeing future events, people’s subjective experiences routinely
transcend the here-and-now [1–5]. This psychological ability to
traverse time rests on a couple of basic requirements: (i) an
underlying cognitive representation of time [5]; and (ii) a neuro-
anatomical network that supports temporal self-projection [6].
Interestingly, while an extensive literature has identified regions of
the brain that support mental time travel (MTT), [2,7–10]
considerably less is known about the structural properties of
temporal representation. The problem is absorbing, how do
people characterize something as intangible as time? As it turns
out, to resolve the puzzle of temporal construal the mind employs
a clever strategy – abstract temporal concepts (e.g., past, future) are
translated into concrete spatial representations, a tactic that is
consistent with theories of magnitude [11], metaphoric cognition
[12–15] and embodiment [16]. Put simply, people use space to
think about time.
Pervading language, cognition and action, examples of space-
time mapping abound. For example, people talk of putting the
past behind them and focusing on the year ahead [17]. Beyond the
application of such linguistic metaphors, gestural patterns,
movement dynamics and attentional processing also reveal that
temporal information is systematically prescribed to spatial
locations [18–25]. Notwithstanding the universal occurrence of
this psychological phenomenon [14,15] the manifold characteris-
tics of space-time mapping are subject to important cultural
variation. Notably, precisely where temporal concepts are located
in space (e.g., forward, back, left, right, up, down) is flexible [25]
and can be impacted both by sociolinguistic custom (e.g., reading/
writing direction) [22,26–30] and experiential factors (e.g.,
movement of the sun) [31].
The fact that sociolinguistic convention (e.g., reading/writing
direction) provides a plane onto which time can be mapped gives
rise to some important effects. Along this culturally defined axis,
time is portrayed as a linear progression of events (i.e., the flow of
time) with the present moment lying at the intersection of that
which has already happened and experiences which have yet to
occur [32]. Taking the form of a mental timeline (MTL) [33] this
representation is used to spatially organize events of personal,
cultural and historical significance. Evidence corroborating the
existence of a MTL comes from the spatial-temporal association of
response codes or STARC effect [34]. In a seminal investigation, it
was shown that when asked to associate sequential daily events
(e.g., breakfast, lunch, dinner) with locations in space, American
children (left-to-right reading/writing direction) followed the early-
left/late-right ordering of events, whereas Arab children (right-to-
left reading/writing direction) displayed the opposite pattern [30].
Replicating and extending these findings to chronometric mea-
sures, recent work has revealed a bias in the ease with which
manual responses can be elicited by stimuli with temporal
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connotations. For example, while past-related words are respond-
ed to most quickly with the left hand, future-related words yield a
right-hand advantage – an effect that is reversed in Hebrew
speakers [35] (for related findings see [19,27,28,36]).
While cultural forces exert a significant influence on the
directionality of mental timelines (e.g., horizontal vs. vertical)
[27] other factors that reliably impact the spatialization of time
have yet to be elucidated. In this respect, the nature of recollective
experiences (i.e., event simulation) may play a pivotal role in
shaping the structural characteristics of space-time mapping. It is
well established that episodic memories serve as the building
blocks of MTT [4,9]. Both neuropsychological and behavioral
investigations converge on two important findings. First, simulat-
ing future outcomes on the basis of prior experience relies on
overlapping neural structures and cognitive operations [2,8,37]. In
other words, there is an explicit connection between episodic
memory and episodic-future thought [2,9]. Second, impairments
in episodic memory impede the efficacy of MTT [4,7,38–40].
Specifically, difficulties in remembering events from the past
translate into problems envisaging episodes in the future.
Therefore, if episodic content provides a basis for MTT which,
in turn, is supported by spatial representations of time, might the
nature of recollective and prospective experience also impact the
topography of space-time mapping?
Aside from brain damage, illness, and aging [9] a critical
determinant of the characteristics (e.g., complexity, detail,
richness) of episodic memory is the target to which the
recollections apply. According to the self-reference effect (SRE),
people remember more information about themselves than any
other individual [41–44]. Moreover, the amount and quality of
episodic detail retained for others diminishes as targets become less
familiar [45]. Thus, one is likely to remember very little about the
dentist, a great deal about Uncle Frank and an enormous amount
about self. These differences in episodic memory raise an
interesting possibility. Perhaps the spatial representation of time
is sensitive to the amount of self-relevant episodic detail a given
temporal period contains. Specifically, the spatial extent of time
(i.e., how much space a unit of time occupies) may reflect the
richness of episodic content (e.g., more detail = more time/space)
[11].
If operating, such a space-time mapping effect gives rise to
noteworthy predictions. First, self-time should occupy more space
than a comparable temporal period for any other target (e.g., best
friend). Second, this spatialization effect should be more
pronounced for temporally proximal (i.e. near) than distal (i.e.
far) periods, as both recollection and future-based simulation are
known to decrease dramatically in both frequency and detail as a
function of increasing temporal distance from the present [46–54].
Of note, this latter prediction is consistent with Trope and
Liberman’s influential construal level theory of psychological
distance [55–57]. As psychological distance (spatial, temporal,
social) increases, mental construal is routinely characterized by a
shift from concrete (e.g., episodic) to abstract (e.g., semantic)
representations [57–60]. What this again suggests is that target-
based effects on the spatialization of time should be more evident
for proximal than distal temporal eras. We explored these
predictions using both spatial (Experiment 1) and temporal
(Experiment 2) measures of space-time mapping.
Experiment 1
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to provide an initial
investigation into the effects of target familiarity and temporal
proximity on the spatial representation of time. Drawing from
related work regarding the assessment of mediolateral (i.e., left-to-
right) number-space mappings [61], we adapted a simple line
segmentation task whereby participants located events (i.e.,
birthdays) along a horizontal line. More specifically, participants
marked the location of either their own, their best friend’s or a
hypothetical stranger’s birthdays in the past (i.e., 8th and 9th
birthdays), present (i.e., previous and next birthdays) and future
(i.e., 58th and 59th birthdays). In this way, participants were in fact
denoting the spatial boundaries of a fixed unit of time (i.e., one
year). If differences in episodic content influence the mapping of
time to space, then reductions in such detail (i.e., via diminished
self-relevance or increased temporal remoteness) should be
accompanied by decreases in the extent to which a single year is
represented spatially.
Methods
Ethics statement. The study was reviewed and approved by
the School of Psychology, University of Aberdeen Ethics
Committee. All participants gave written informed consent prior
to taking part.
Participants and design. Sixty participants (42 female),
aged between 18 and 32 years (M= 22.6 years) from the University
of Aberdeen took part in an experiment exploring the mental
representation of time. A 3 (Target: self, best friend, unfamiliar
other)63 (Time: past, present, or future) mixed-model design with
repeated measures on the second factor was employed.
Procedure and materials. The experiment employed a line
segmentation task (see [61] for a similar method) in which
participants were asked to indicate the location of events along a
hypothetical timeline. Participants were presented with a horizon-
tal black line (360 mm) printed on a standard A3 (2976430 mm)
sheet of white paper. The line was unbounded [62] and bisected
with a vertical line (10 mm), which was labeled ‘NOW’. Labeling
the line oriented the participants to a temporal framework and
attempted to dispel any assumptions that the line was a ‘‘life line’’
(i.e., beginning at birth and ending at death) as the age of our
participants would not suggest that they were currently half way
through their lives.
Participants were initially given instructions regarding the target
whose birthdays they would be locating on the timeline (n= 20 per
condition). Those in the ‘self’ condition were instructed to mark
their own birthdays while those in the ‘best friend’ condition were
instructed to think of a close friend similar in age to themselves.
Finally, participants in the ‘unfamiliar other’ condition were told
to think of a hypothetical stranger whose birth date was the same
as theirs. Next, participants were asked to mark the location on the
timeline of six specific birthdays, two representing the past (i.e., 8th
and 9th birthdays), two representing the present (i.e., previous and
next birthdays) and two representing the future (i.e., 58th and 59th
birthdays). The experimenter presented the birthdays one at a
time (i.e., allowing for a response to be made before continuing to
the next) in a unique random order for each participant. After
completing all six trials participants were debriefed and dismissed.
Results and Discussion
All participants followed a left-to-right ordering of time whereby
birthdays from the past were located to the left side of the line,
while those in the future were marked on the right side. The size of
participants’ spatial representations of one year in time was
assessed by measuring (in mm) the distance between the marks
corresponding to the two birthdays representing the past (i.e., 8th
and 9th), present (i.e., previous and next) and future (i.e., 58th and
59th) periods separately. These distances were compared using a 3
Space-Time Mapping
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(Target: self, best friend, unfamiliar other)63 (Time: past, present,
future) mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA), with repeated
measures on the second factor. This revealed main effects of
Target, F(2, 57) = 6.42, p= .003, gp
2 = 0.18, whereby the amount
of space used to represent one year increased as a function of
target familiarity (i.e., self . best friend . unfamiliar other; Tukey
a, p,.05); and Time, F(2,114) = 43.64, p,.001, gp
2 = 0.43,
whereby more space was used to represent one year in the
present than in the past or the future (i.e., present .past = future;
Tukey a, p,.05).
Importantly, these effects were qualified by a Target6Time
interaction, F(4, 114) = 2.82, p,.001, gp
2 = .20 (see Figure 1). To
examine this effect further, simple main effects analyses were
performed to compare the effect of target at each time period.
Although no differences were found as a function of target for
either the past or future periods, a significant effect was revealed
for the present time period, F(2, 57) = 7.37, p= .001. Of note, there
was a strong linear trend (p,.001) such that participants in the
‘self’ condition used the most space to represent one year in the
present (M= 47.2 mm), followed by participants in the ‘best friend’
condition (M= 30.8 mm) and finally those in the ‘unfamiliar other’
condition (M= 14.3 mm).
These results suggest that both the target and the time period
influenced the amount of space participants used to represent one
year in time. Where the amount of episodic content might be
expected to be greater (i.e., for self-relevant and temporally
proximal contexts), one year of time occupied more space than for
less episodically rich events. In particular, when considering the
present year, a strong positive linear relationship was observed
between target familiarity and the extent of the spatial represen-
tation of time. That is, consistent with the predicted effects, a year
relative to self occupied more space than the same time period
relative to a close friend, which in turn was represented as larger
than a year in the life of an unfamiliar other. Interestingly,
although a year in the present was consistently represented as
larger than a year in either the past or future, no difference was
found between the latter two time periods despite an asymmetry in
their respective temporal distances from the present (i.e., for all the
participants their 8th and 9th birthdays were more temporally
proximal than their 58th and 59th birthdays). One possibility here
is that the remoteness in time of these events relegate them to be
represented as generically in the past/future without reference to
specifically how temporally distant they might be. If this is the case,
the lack of target effects at the past and future time points may be
due to relatively less concrete representations of time when
temporally remote events are considered [55]. We sought to
replicate and extend these findings in Experiment 2 by focusing on
a more constrained time-frame (i.e.,610 years), and employing an
alternative, temporally-based index of space-time mapping.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was designed to conceptually replicate the
relationship between episodic content and the scaling of
Figure 1. Mediolateral Spatialization of Time. Spatial representation of one year (mm) as a function of time period (i.e., past, present, future)
and target (i.e., self, best friend, unfamiliar other) in Experiment 1. Error bars represent 61SEM.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049228.g001
Space-Time Mapping
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spatiotemporal mappings reported above. Importantly, a novel
method was employed that required participants to estimate the
duration of a hypothetical journey to specific events (i.e.,
birthdays) in the past and future. This approach had two
substantive points of difference from the method used in
Experiment 1. First, participants mapped time to space along
the anterioposterior (i.e., front-to-back) plane whereby, at least
amongst English speakers, the past metaphorically lies behind
and the future in front [17]. Second, participants engaged in a
more dynamic task in which they were exposed to patterns of
optic flow designed to simulate self-motion while they ‘travelled’
to target events. Such displays reliably induce experiences of
vection (i.e., apparent self-motion) [63], shape the temporal
locus of MTT [20], and support mental simulations of long
distance travel [64]. In this latter study, participants were asked
to imagine travelling to (spatially) distant locations with the
duration of exposure to the optic flow display used to measure
the length of the journeys. The current experiment adapted this
technique, asking participants to ‘time travel’ to their own or
others’ birthdays in the past and future while viewing centripetal
or centrifugal optic flow patterns (i.e., specifying backwards and
forwards movement respectively).
Method
Ethics statement. The study was reviewed and approved by
the School of Psychology, University of Aberdeen Ethics
Committee. All participants gave written informed consent prior
to taking part.
Participants and design. Sixty-three participants (37 fe-
male), aged between 18 and 32 years (M= 21.6 years) from the
University of Aberdeen took part in an experiment exploring the
perception of time. A 3 (Target: self, best friend, unfamiliar other)
62 (Temporal direction: past, future)610 (Temporal distance: 1–
10 years from present) mixed-model design with repeated
measures on the final two factors was employed.
Procedure and materials. A dynamic star-field display
adapted from previous work [20] was employed to induce vection
(i.e., apparent self motion) and support the experience of
‘travelling’ to the target events. The display consisted of
approximately 1000 white dots (i.e., stars) animated (25 fps) so
as to move either toward (i.e., centripetally) or away from (i.e.,
centrifugally) the centre of the display (see Figure 2), corresponding
to the experience of backward and forward self motion respectively
[63].
Upon arrival participants were told that their task was to
operate a notional ‘time machine’ which they would be required to
stop at various events in the past or future. They were seated at a
desk approximately 2.5 m away from a large screen onto which
the animated star-field display was projected (image size:
1.4561.10 m). A response box with a green and a red button
was used by participants to begin (i.e., initiate the star-field
animation) and end (i.e., stop the animation) each trial (i.e., ‘time
travel’ event). Initially participants completed two practice trials,
one accompanied by the centripetal (i.e., backward) and the other
by the centrifugal (i.e., forward) star-field display, in order to
familiarize them with the procedure.
Next participants were given instructions regarding the events to
which they would be travelling (n= 21 per condition). In line with
Experiment 1, those in the ‘self’ condition travelled to their own
birthdays, those in the ‘best friend’ condition travelled to the
birthdays of a close friend similar in age to themselves, while those
in the ‘unfamiliar other’ condition travelled to the birthdays of a
hypothetical stranger whose birth date was the same as theirs.
Participants were then asked their age, which was used to calculate
the target birthdays (e.g., a 20 year old participant travelling 5
years into the future would be asked to stop the ‘time machine’ at
their 25th birthday). Each trial began with a target destination
presented on the screen (e.g., Please travel to your friend’s 14th
birthday) and participants then started the ‘time machine’ (i.e., the
star-field display), stopping it again once they felt they had arrived
at the target birthday. Target destinations in the past were
accompanied by the centripetal (i.e., backward) star-field display
while those in the future were accompanied by the centrifugal (i.e.,
forward) display. Each participant completed 20 trials (1–10 years
in the past and future) in a unique random order. Eprime 2.0 was
used to present the trials and record the length of time participants
took to ‘travel’ to each birthday (i.e., the time elapsed between
starting and stopping the ‘time machine’). Because the star-field
animations were always presented at a constant speed, the
duration of each ‘journey’ corresponded to the distance travelled,
that is, the amount of space used to represent a given period of
time.
Figure 2. Vection Displays. Illustrations of the direction of optical
flow specified by the star-field displays in Experiment 2. The top panel
shows centripetal flow specifying backwards vection (i.e., past trials)
while the bottom panel shows centrifugal flow specifying forwards
vection (i.e., future trials).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049228.g002
Space-Time Mapping
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 November 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 11 | e49228
Results and Discussion
In contrast to Experiment 1 where discrete units of time were
the focus of the analyses, here we treated time as a continuous
construct. That is, instead of comparing individual 1-year units of
time we investigated more general patterns by initially fitting each
participant’s data with a regression line for the past and future
trials separately. This yielded parameter estimates for the y-
intercept, corresponding to the ‘size’ of the hypothetical present
(i.e., time 60), and slope, corresponding to the change in the ‘size’
of time as a function of temporal distance from the present (i.e.,
time 61–10 years), of each line.
The y-intercepts of the regression lines were compared using a 3
(Target: self, best friend, unfamiliar other) 62 (Temporal
direction: past, future) mixed-model ANOVA with repeated
measures on the second factor. This revealed a main effect of
Target, F(2,60) = 3.32, p= .04, gp
2 = 0.10 (see Figure 3). Follow-up
analyses comparing the three Target conditions again revealed
evidence of a strong linear trend (p= .015) whereby participants
travelled farther (i.e., used more space) to events that were more
self-relevant (i.e., self . best friend . unfamiliar other). There was
no effect of Temporal direction, suggesting symmetrical spatial
representations of past and future events, nor was there a
Target6Temporal direction interaction.
The slopes of the regression lines were compared using a 3
(Target: self, best friend, unfamiliar other) 62 (Temporal
direction: past, future) mixed-model ANOVA with repeated
measures on the second factor. No significant effects were
revealed. Inspection of the overall mean slope indicates a general
positive relationship between time and space. Specifically, on
average participants took 836 ms to travel each additional year in
time.
Taken together, these results provide further evidence that
variations in self-relevant episodic content relative to past and
future events are reflected in the manner in which participants use
space as a proxy for thinking about time. Consistent with
Experiment 1, here participants again showed a positive linear
relationship between target familiarity (i.e. self-relevant episodic
content) and the amount of space used to represent a given period
of time. Moreover, the relationship between space and time was
shown to be monotonic (i.e., more time = more space) and
symmetrical across past and future events. However, in contrast
to Experiment 1, there was no evidence that the impact of target
familiarity diminished as a function of temporal distance (i.e., no
effects of target were found when considering the slope of the
regression lines). Although the influence of the differing method-
ologies should not be overlooked, the more proximal time-frame
employed here (i.e., 610 years) suggests that the effects of target-
relevant episodic content on time-space mapping are indeed most
prominent when representing more temporally tangible events.
General Discussion
The current research revealed that the spatial representation of
time varied as a function of target familiarity and temporal
proximity. Across two experiments self-time was represented as
occupying a greater extent of space than time relevant to other
targets (i.e., best friend or unfamiliar other). Importantly, this effect
was symmetrical across past and future events, and consistent
regardless of whether time was mapped spatially across a
mediolateral timeline (E1) or temporally along the anterioposterior
plane (E2), suggesting a generality across temporal direction,
mapping direction and modality.
This variation in the amount of space used to represent time is
consistent with robust and systematic fluctuations in self-relevant
episodic content. Put simply, a greater amount of space was used
to represent temporal units that were associated with rich episodic
detail than those that likely contained relatively less episodic
content. As predicted, this effect held with respect to both target
familiarity (i.e., more familiar = more space) and time period (i.e.,
more proximal times = more space), two variables that are known
to influence episodic richness (e.g., [11,41–45,47,48,51–53).
Further, these effects corroborate and extend extant work on the
impact that psychological distance exerts on mental construal [55–
57]. Aside from the range of effects previously reported, detail-rich
simulations of proximal events (i.e., concrete representations) also
seem to modulate the spatialization of time. As such, the current
results speak directly to the manner in which time is cognitively
represented – the very same factors that shape retrospective and
prospective thought (i.e., variations in episodic content and
quality) also systematically influence spatiotemporal mapping.
That is, rather than time being mapped to space in a fixed, linear
manner (i.e., 1 unit of time = 1 unit of space), the spatial location of
temporal events is more subjectively scaled. Specifically, consistent
with the predictions of construal level theory, more space is
allocated to events that feature self-relevant and episodically rich
(i.e., more concrete) mental representations.
A closer examination of the current findings suggests that the
effect of target familiarity (i.e., more familiar = more space) was
only evident when considering temporally proximal events. In
particular, events from either early (e.g., 8th and 9th birthdays) or
later (e.g., 58th and 59th birthdays) in life did not reveal differences
in the spatial extent of one-year as a function of target (E1). In
contrast, when a more constrained period of time (i.e., 610 years)
was employed, the target effect remained consistent independent
of temporal distance from the present (E2). To this end, the period
between ages approximately 10 and 30 years is characterized by a
uniquely well-preserved level of detail of episodic content (i.e.,
reminiscence bump) [65,66]. On the other hand, events in the more
distant past or future tend to not vary substantially in terms of
episodic richness, but instead are characterized by reference to
typical life events (e.g., learning to ride a bicycle, having
grandchildren) [67–69]. Thus, the contrast between the highly
idiosyncratic nature of self-relevant episodic content at proximal
Figure 3. Anterioposterior Spatialization of Time. Temporal
representation of the ‘size’ of the hypothetical present (i.e., y-intercept
representing time 60) as a function of target (i.e., self, best friend,
unfamiliar other) in Experiment 2. Error bars represent 61SEM.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049228.g003
Space-Time Mapping
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 November 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 11 | e49228
time periods (e.g., 610 years) and the distinctly prototypical event
representations that exemplify more temporally distant episodes
may underlie the current pattern of results.
While episodic richness offers a coherent explanation of the
effects reported herein, it is worth noting that other factors may
also be at play. For example, not only do self, best friend and a
hypothetical stranger differ in terms of episodic content, but also
with respect to affective significance (i.e., liking) and semantic
knowledge [70]. Although it is unclear how exactly these factors
relate to space-time mapping, a useful task for future research will
be to establish if they influence the spatialization of time. One line
of inquiry could explore spatiotemporal mappings for well known
and disliked others (e.g., a despised former partner) or hypothetical
strangers for whom varying amounts of semantic (or indeed
episodic) information have been provided. Additionally, the
complexities of space-time mapping potentially extend beyond
what content is reactivated when contemplating past and future
events. Precisely how an event is simulated may also impact the
nature of spatiotemporal mapping. More specifically, the way an
event is construed (e.g., concrete vs. abstract) and the visual
perspective (e.g., field vs. observer) adopted during mental imagery
have important implications for both prospective and retrospective
thinking [55,71–74]. Establishing whether these effects extend to
the spatialization of time is also an important goal for future work.
Importantly, the present findings may have implications for
understanding not only the conceptual foundations of MTT, but
also other temporally-relevant cognitive phenomena (e.g., plan-
ning fallacy) [75]. If people think about self-time as being more
extensive than that for others, such asymmetry may contribute to,
for example, the tendency for individuals to underestimate
prospective task durations for themselves, but overestimate them
for others [76]. To illustrate, more activites may be seen to ‘fit in’ a
given temporal duration when the amount of space ascribed to
that period is enlarged (e.g., self vs. other time). Thus, by using
space to understand temporal constructs, the affordances of a
given period of time (e.g.,what can be achieved in that duration)
may infact be derived not strictly from knowledge of the duration
per se, but also from information pertaining to its spatial proxy
(i.e., episodically-relevant information).
In summary, here we have demonstrated that a basic
characteristic of social cognitive functioning (e.g., self vs. other
differentiation) systematically shapes a decidely asocial aspect of
cognition – the perception of time. Drawing from the notion that
people use space as a proxy for understanding time, across two
studies participants represented self-time as occupying a greater
amount of space that an equivalent period related to others.
Moreover, the extent of this effect reflected the quantity of episodic
content typically associated with specific targets and events
whereby less space was used to represent less episodically rich
occurences. Establishing the behavioural implications of these
findings remains an important challenge for future work.
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